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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW
Rosado v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.: An erosion of the manufac-
turer's non-delegable duty in products liability?
The doctrine of strict products liability' provides that a manu-
facturer who places a defective product into the stream of com-
merce shall be liable for injuries sustained as a result of the prod-
uct's defect.2 Implicit in this body of law is the realization that
the manufacturer has an unparalleled opportunity to ascer-
tain whether a product is free from defects and safe for its in-
' See Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973). In
Codling, the Court of Appeals first enunciated the doctrine of strict products liability in
New York:
[T]he manufacturer of a defective product is liable to any person injured or dam-
aged if the defect [in the product] was a substantial factor in bringing about his
injury or damages; provided: (1) that at the time of the occurrence the product is
being used (whether by the person injured or damaged or by a third person) for
the purpose and in the manner normally intended, (2) that if the person injured
or damaged is himself the user of the product he would not by the exercise of
reasonable care have both discovered the defect and perceived its danger, and (3)
that by the exercise of reasonable care the person injured or damaged would not
otherwise have averted his injury or damages.
Id. at 342, 298 N.E.2d at 628-29, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 469-70. See generally R. EPSTEIN, MODERN
PRODucTs LIABILiTY LAW 3-8 (1980) (history and development of strict products liability); R.
HURSH & H. BAImEY, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODucTs LIABiLITY 2d § 1:1 (1974) (scope of cover-
age of strict products liability); Howard & Watkins, Strict Products Liability in New York
and the Merging of Contract and Tort, 42 ALE. L. REV. 603, 603-09 (1978) (judicial develop-
ment of strict products liability in New York); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
For Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 828-38 (1973) (tests for applying strict products liability).
The doctrine of strict products liability has subsequently been extended to render liable
anyone placing a defective product into the stream of commerce that causes injury, includ-
ing distributors and retailers. See Mead v. Warner Pruyn Div., Finch Pruyn Sales, 57 App.
Div. 2d 340, 344, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (3d Dep't 1977); Kirby v. Rouselle Corp., 108 Misc.
2d 291, 295 n.1, 437 N.Y.S.2d 512, 515 n.1 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1981); see also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 A (1965) (strict products liability extends to anyone
selling defective product that is unreasonably dangerous).
2 See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 478, 403
N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1980); Opera v. Hyva, Inc., 86 App. Div. 2d 373,
376, 450 N.Y.S.2d 615, 617 (4th Dep't 1982); Ribley v. Harsco Corp., 57 App. Div. 2d 228,
230, 394 N.Y.S.2d 740, 741 (3d Dep't 1977). A product can be defective due to the way it
was manufactured, or designed, or because of inadequate warnings from the manufacturer
regarding use. See Voss v. Black and Decker Mfg., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 106-07, 450 N.E.2d 204,
207, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1983); see also Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 125,
417 N.E.2d 545, 551, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 256 (1981) (defect in manufacturing process); Robin-
son, 49 N.Y.2d at 480, 403 N.E.2d at 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (design defect); Torrogrossa
v. Towmotor Co., 44 N.Y.2d 709, 710, 376 N.E.2d 920, 921, 405 N.Y.S.2d 448, 449 (1978)
(defect due to failure to warn); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5,
18 (1965) (defective product is one not reasonably safe).
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tended use.' When non-manufacturer defendants are adjudged lia-
ble in strict products liability actions, 4 they often successfully shift
the loss to the manufacturer of the product under the theory of
indemnification.5 This theory seeks to place the burden of loss on
3 See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 480, 403
N.E.2d 440, 444, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980); Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 340, 298
N.E.2d 622, 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468 (1973); W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
13 (1979); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
Rev. 791, 799 (1966) [hereinafter Fall of Citadel]. The economic realities of commercial en-
terprise also justify imposition of the risk on the manufacturer. See Milau Assoc. v. North
Avenue Div. Corp., 42 N.Y.2d 482, 489, 368 N.E.2d 1247, 1251, 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 886 (1977);
Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d 330, 341, 298 N.E.2d 622, 627-28, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461, 468-69
(1973); Held v. 7-Eleven Food Store, 108 Misc. 2d 754, 757, 438 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1981); W. KIMELE & R. LESHER, supra, at 13; Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1120 (1960) [hereinafter As-
sault on Citadel]; Comment, Torts - Strict Liability - Under Pennsylvania Law a Manu-
facturer May be Held Strictly Liable for Injuries Caused by the Absence of a Safety De-
vice Even When That Device Was Removed at the Request of a Knowledgeable Purchaser:
Hammond v. International Harvester Co., 28 VILL. L. REv. 851, 855 (1982-83).
" See Szrama v. Alumo Prod., 118 Misc. 2d 1008, 1012, 462 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (Sup. Ct.
Erie County 1983) (retailer held liable); Nickel v. Hyster Co., 97 Misc. 2d 770, 771, 412
N.Y.S.2d 273, 274 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1978) (manufacturers, distributors, retailers,
processors and makers of component parts may be liable); Queensbury Union Free School
Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc. 2d 804, 807, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (Sup. Ct. Warren
County 1977) (liability extends to suppliers and vendors of defective product); see also
supra note 1 (extension of strict products liability beyond manufacturers). Despite the
broadened scope of strict products liability, transactions consisting primarily of services are
not within its purview. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Enco Assoc., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 398, 372
N.E.2d 555, 559, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 772 (1977); Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y.
100, 104, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954).
5 See, e.g., McDermott v. City of New York, 50 N.Y.2d 211, 215-16, 406 N.E.2d 460,
462-63, 428 N.Y.S.2d 643, 644-45 (1980) (employer may seek indemnification from manufac-
turer where employee injured by defective truck); Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d
553, 562-63, 300 N.E.2d 403, 408, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28-29 (1973) (building owner indemnified
by manufacturer where tenant injured due to defective elevator).
Indemnity fundamentally differs from contribution; indemnity seeks to shift the entire
responsibility for the loss while contribution distributes the loss among joint tortfeasors ac-
cording to their pro-rata share. See D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 55 N.Y.2d 454, 460-61,
435 N.E.2d 366, 368-69, 450 N.Y.S.2d 149, 151-52 (1982); McFall v. Compagnie Maritime
Belge (Lloyd Royal), 304 N.Y. 314, 327-28, 107 N.E.2d 463, 471 (1952); SIEGEL, NEW YORK
PRACTICE § 169 (1978); Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA.
L. REv. 130, 130-31 (1932); Woods, Some Observations on Contribution and Indemnity, 38
AnK. L. REv. 44, 44 (1985).
Indemnity between parties can be pursuant to express agreement, see Vey v. Port
Auth., 54 N.Y.2d 221, 226-27, 429 N.E.2d 762, 764, 445 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (1981); Hogeland v.
Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 42 N.Y.2d 153, 159, 366 N.E.2d 263, 266, 397 N.Y.S.2d 602, 606
(1977); Margolin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 32 N.Y.2d 149, 153, 297 N.E.2d 80, 82, 344
N.Y.S.2d 336, 338-39 (1973), however, it is often implied by law to prevent unjust results.
See McDermott, 50 N.Y.2d at 216-17, 406 N.E.2d at 462, 428 N.Y.S.2d at 646; Rock v. Reed-
Prentice Div. of Package Mach., 39 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 346 N.E.2d 520, 522, 382 N.Y.S.2d 720,
722 (1976); Kelly v. Diesel Div. of Carl A. Morse, Inc., 35 N.Y.2d 1, 7, 315 N.E.2d 751, 754,
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the party primarily responsible for the product's defect.6 Recently,
in Rosado v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc.," the Court of Appeals re-
fused to recognize a converse right to indemnification for manufac-
turers." In this strict products liability action brought by an in-
jured employee of the purchaser against the manufacturer, the
court held that the manufacturer of a defective product could not
obtain indemnification from the purchaser where the purchaser
had contractually agreed to install necessary safety devices. 9
In Rosado, the plaintiff was employed by Comet Fibers
(Comet) as a garnett operator. 10 Comet had purchased the garnett
in 1970 from Proctor & Schwartz, the manufacturer, and, pursuant
to the sales contract, agreed to install all necessary safety guards
for the machine's exposed moving parts." Comet installed a mesh
fence around the gear and pulley area of the garnett but failed to
install the safety guards.12 On September 9, 1976, the plaintiff's
358 N.Y.S.2d 685, 689-90 (1974).
8 See State v. Stewart's Ice Cream Co., 64 N.Y.2d 83, 88, 473 N.E.2d 1184, 1186, 484
N.Y.S.2d 810, 812 (1984); Rogers v. Dorchester Assoc., 32 N.Y.2d 553, 562-63, 300 N.E.2d
403, 408, 347 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28-29 (1973); Garrett v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 86 App. Div. 2d 469,
470-71, 450 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (4th Dep't 1982). Indemnity often provides a basis of relief
for a party found liable to a plaintiff due to imputed or vicarious liability rather than per-
sonal fault. See Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Rowland Tomkins Corp., 585 F. Supp. 969, 973
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Tokio Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 465 F. Supp.
790, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); see also W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER
AND KEETON ON ToRTs 341 (5th ed. 1984) (indemnity operates in favor of one held responsi-
ble by imputation of law because of relation to wrongdoer). See generally The Quarterly
Survey, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co: A Revolution in New York Law, 47 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
185, 194-200 (1972) (discussing development of indemnity doctrine in New York).
It is well settled in New York, however, that indemnity is precluded where the party
seeking it has actually engaged in wrongful conduct. See County of Westchester v. Welton
Becket Assoc., 102 App. Div. 2d 34, 47, 478 N.Y.S.2d 305, 314 (2d Dep't 1984); Hanley v.
Fox, 97 App. Div. 2d 606, 607, 468 N.Y.S.2d 193, 194 (3d Dep't 1983); see also RESTATE-
MENT OF RESTTrUTION § 76 (1937) (wrongful conduct bars indemnity).
7 66 N.Y.2d 21, 484 N.E.2d 1354, 494 N.Y.S.2d 851 (1985).
' See id. at 22, 484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
0 See id.
10 See id. A garnett is a machine containing massive chains and pulleys commonly used
in the textile industry to convert clumped fibers into matting. See id.
" Id. at 23, 484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852. The sales contract stated that
Comet would install all "necessary guards for the exposed moving parts of the machine in
accordance with the laws of the district in which the machine is to be located," and "supply
disconnect switches as required." Id. The garnett was delivered to Comet without the safety
guards. Id.
12 See id. The mesh fence had a gate, secured by a simple latch, approximately three
feet from the machine which was fully operable with the gate open. Id. Apparently, it was
customary for the workers to operate the garnett with the gate open and all the pulleys,
chains and gears exposed. Id.
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thumb and fingers on his right hand were severed when they acci-
dentally came in contact with the exposed chain and gears.-3
The plaintiff brought suit against the manufacturer, Proctor,
who in turn brought a third party action against Comet for indem-
nification and contribution. 4 The Supreme Court, Trial Term,
New York County, dismissed the defendant Proctor's indemnifica-
tion claim.' 5 Comet thereafter arranged a settlement with the
plaintiff thus foreclosing Proctor's contribution claim."6 The de-
fendant appealed the dismissal of the indemnification claim and
the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed by a divided
court.
17
The Court of Appeals, in a unanimous opinion, affirmed the
dismissal of the indemnification claim. 8 The court, in an opinion
by Judge Titone, summarily rejected the applicability of implied
11 Id. The plaintiff was raking debris from under the machine while it was in operation
when, hearing a terrible noise, he backed away from the machine. Id. As he did so, he hit his
back on the mesh fence and was thrust forward causing his hand to come into contact with
the exposed chain and gears. Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
Id., 484 N.E.2d at 1355-56, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53. In New York, a joint tortfeasor is
relieved from contribution when he agrees to a settlement with the injured party. See N.Y.
GEN. OsLIG. LAW. § 15-108(b) (McKinney 1978). This section provides that a "release given
in good faith by the injured person to one tortfeasor . . . relieves [the tortfeasor] from lia-
bility to any other person for contribution." Id.; see, e.g., Mitchell v. New York Hosp., 61
N.Y.2d 208, 215-16, 461 N.E.2d 285, 289, 473 N.Y.S.2d 148, 152 (1984); Kelly v. New York
Tel. Co., 100 App. Div. 2d 537, 537, 473 N.Y.S.2d 480, 481 (2d Dep't 1984).
Section 15-108(b) represents a legislative desire to encourage settlement in tort cases
following the problems resulting from Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d
288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972). See 1974 N.Y. LEGIs. ANN. 15-16; N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-
108, commentary at 717-18 (McKinney 1978); see also The Quarterly Survey, supra note 6,
at 203-09 ("revolutionary nature of the Dole decision is much greater than the court indi-
cated"). Dole established the right of equitable contribution among joint tortfeasors. See
Dole, 30 N.Y.2d at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92. The decision was subse-
quently interpreted to allow contribution among joint tortfeasors notwithstanding a
tortfeasor's prior settlement with the injured plaintiff. See Blass v. Hennessey, 44 App. Div.
2d 405, 406, 355 N.Y.S.2d 506, 507 (4th Dep't 1974). This interpretation eliminated a de-
fendant's incentive to settle a tort case and paved the way for legislative response. See N.Y.
GEN. OBLG. LAW § 15-108, commentary at 718 (McKinney 1978).
Indemnification is not within the ambit of section 15-108 and therefore the defendant's
claim for indemnification in Rosado was not precluded by Comet's settlement with the
plaintiff. See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 24-25, 484 N.E.2d at 1356, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
17 106 App. Div. 2d 27, 40, 483 N.Y.S.2d 271, 281 (1st Dep't 1984). Proctor conceded
that any contribution claim was barred by General Obligations Law section 15-108, and that
no basis for express contractual indemnity existed since Comet had not agreed to indemnify
or hold it harmless from products liability claims. Rosada, 66 N.Y.2d at 25, 484 N.E.2d at
1357, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 854.
'8 Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 22, 484 N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
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indemnity pursuant to the sales contract as a theory of recovery
for the manufacturer.19 An action in strict products liability
against a manufacturer is stated, the court reasoned, where it is
shown that a defective product, not reasonably safe for its in-
tended use, is placed into the stream of commerce by the manufac-
turer.20 The court further reasoned that since a manufacturer is in
the best position to know the dangers inherent in its machine, and
such dangers are common to all jobsites, the manufacturer is also
best suited to know what safety devices are necessary.21 Noting
that prevention of injuries is the cornerstone of strict products lia-
bility law,22 the court concluded that to allow a manufacturer to
shift the ultimate duty of care for a machine lacking essential
safety features through "boilerplate language in a sales contract,
would erode the economic incentive manufacturers have to main-
tain safety and give sanction to the marketing of dangerous,
stripped down, machines. '23
By denying a manufacturer of an unsafe machine the right to
,9 Id. at 26, 484 N.E.2d at 1357-58, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 854-55. In rejecting Proctor's argu-
ment of implied indemnity, the court acknowledged that there was contrary authority in
another jurisdiction. Id.; Proctor & Schwartz, Inc. v. United States Equip. Co., 624 F.2d 771,
775 (6th Cir. 1980). In Proctor, the court held, on facts similar to Rosado, that Michigan
"recognizes an implied contract, arising from the promise to perform an act or furnish a
product, as a basis for indemnity." Id. at 776; see Skinner v. D-M-E Corp., 124 Mich. App.
580, 584-85, 335 N.W.2d 90, 92 (1983). The Rosado court concluded, however, that the
weight of authority, see Hammond v. International Harvester, 691 F.2d 646, 652 (3d Cir.
1982); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010, 1021 (D.R.I. 1977); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg.
Corp., 60 N.J. 402, 410, 290 A.2d 281, 285 (1972), was consonant with their holding. See
Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 26, 484 N.E.2d at 1357-58, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 854-55.
10 See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 25-26, 484 N.E.2d at 1357, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 854; Robinson
v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach., 49 N.Y.2d at 479, 403 N.E.2d at 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d
at 720; Codling v. Paglia, 32 N.Y.2d at 340-41, 298 N.E.2d at 627, 345 N.Y.S.2d at 468-69;
supra note 2 and accompanying text.
", See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 26, 484 N.E.2d at 1358, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 855; see supra
note 3 and accompanying text. See generally W. KIMrmLE & R. LESHER, supra note 3, at 13
("manufacturer could anticipate some hazards and guard against recurrence of others, as
public could not"); Fall of Citadel, supra note 3, at 799 (manufacturer best able to provide
maximum protection for user of product).
22 See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 484 N.E.2d at 1358, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 855; see also
Fall of Citadel, supra note 3, at 799 (public interest requires maximum protection of
consumer).
13 See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 26-27, 484 N.E.2d at 1358, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 855. The de-
fendant, Proctor, vigorously disagreed with the characterization of the contract language as
"boilerplate." See Reply Brief for Defendant and Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant at 7. See
also supra note 3 (cases discussing economic underpinnings of strict products liability). See
generally Spacone, A Practical Guide To Controlling Products Liability Costs, 7 J. PROD.
LIAB. 365 (1984) (prudent manufacturer can do much to reduce products liability costs).
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implied indemnity from a purchaser who agreed to make such ma-
chine safe, it is submitted that the Rosado decision properly reaf-
firmed the fundamental principles of strict products liability first
enunciated in Codling v. Paglia.24 Every manufacturer shoulders a
non-delegable duty to place products into the stream of commerce
that are free from defects and safe for their intended use.25 In a
strict products liability action, the critical temporal element neces-
sary for liability to attach to a manufacturer is that the defect
must exist when the product leaves the manufacturer's hands.26 It
is submitted that the manufacture and sale of an industrial ma-
chine lacking essential safety devices, notwithstanding an agree-
ment that the purchaser will install such devices, clearly fails to
discharge the manufacturer's non-delegable duty, thereby placing
it within the scope of liability. 27
24 32 N.Y.2d 330, 298 N.E.2d 622, 345 N.Y.S.2d 461 (1973).
2 See Robinson v. Reed-Prentice Div. of Package Mach., 49 N.Y.2d 471, 479, 403
N.E.2d 440, 443, 426 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (1980); Blackburn v. Johnson Chem. Co., 128 Misc.
2d 623, 624, 490 N.Y.S.2d 452, 453 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1985); see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text (manufacturer's liability for defective product).
6 See Cover v. Cohen, 61 N.Y.2d 261, 267, 461 N.E.2d 864, 866, 473 N.Y.S.2d 378, 380
(1984); Steckal v. Haughton Elevator Co., 59 N.Y.2d 628, 629, 449 N.E.2d 1264, 1265, 463
N.Y.S.2d 186, 187 (1983); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 107, 450 N.E.2d 204,
207, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 401 (1983); see also W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 3, at 85
(defect must exist at time product leaves defendant's control whether defendant is manufac-
turer, retailer, or other party); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect In Products Liability Law -
A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 585 (1980) (liability attaches if product
"defective and unreasonably dangerous at the time possession was surrendered").
27 See supra notes 2, 25-26 and accompanying text. But see Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 64
App. Div. 2d 204, 207, 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (4th Dep't 1978). In Biss, the defendant
sold the plaintiff a vehicle which had an available roll over protective system that the plain-
tiff chose not to purchase. See id. at 207, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 876. When an employee of the
plaintiff died due to injuries sustained in an accident involving the vehicle, suit was brought
alleging that the absence of a roll over protective system constituted a design defect. Id. at
205, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 875. The Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held, as a matter of
law, that the vehicle was not defectively designed, reasoning that the manufacturer's notice
to the purchaser of an available safety structure effectively discharged their duty to exercise
reasonable care in designing the loader. Id. at 207, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 876. The court stated
that where the likelihood of roll over varied by job and site, the purchaser was best suited to
determine whether optional safety equipment was necessary to avoid unreasonable risk. Id.
Biss involved optional safety equipment and therefore is factually distinguishable from
Rosado where the safety devices were essential. Compare Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 23, 484
N.E.2d at 1355, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 852 with Biss, 64 App. Div. 2d at 207, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 876.
Irrespective of their factual distinctions, Rosado and Biss both seemingly adhere to the sub-
stantive principle that the party best suited to determine whether the safety device is
needed, whether manufacturer or purchaser, should bear the responsibility for resulting in-
juries. See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 26, 484 N.E.2d at 1358, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 855; Biss, 64 App
Div. 2d at 207-08, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77.
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Though properly precluding recovery based on implied indem-
nity in Rosado, the court left the door ajar for recovery based on
express contractual indemnity in these same situations.28 Although
no basis for recovery pursuant to express contractual indemnity
existed,29 the court seemingly implied that recovery would have
been possible had the purchaser specifically undertaken that re-
sponsibility in the sales agreement.3 0 It is submitted that should
the court adopt a judicially permissive attitude toward recovery
pursuant to express contractual indemnity in future situations sim-
ilar to Rosado, it will allow manufacturers to delegate a duty that
has heretofore been found non-delegable.31 Such a view will hasten
the "erosion" of safety in manufacturing that the court specifically
sought to prevent in Rosado3 2 It is further submitted that the
principles underlying the denial of implied indemnity to the manu-
facturer in Rosado - the protection of the public from unsafe ma-
chinery and the imposition of liability on the entity most responsi-
ble and best suited to make the machine safe - are equally cogent
where the purchaser signs an express indemnification agreement.
In Rosado, the Court of Appeals, by refusing to allow the man-
ufacturer to recover from the purchaser pursuant to implied in-
demnity, effectuated the theoretical underpinnings of the strict
products liability doctrine. In order to assure safety in manufactur-
ing and to prevent manufacturers from insulating themselves from
liability to users and purchasers, the court must be equally resis-
tant to permitting recovery based on express contractual indem-
nity clauses in future cases factually similar to Rosado.
Robert E. Rice
28 See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 25, 484 N.E.2d at 1357, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 854; infra notes
29-30 and accompanying text. It is submitted that the court's failure to underscore the man-
ufacturer's non-delegable duty in its analysis, see Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 25-27, 484 N.E.2d at
1357-58, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 854-55, as it has in previous strict products liability actions, see
supra note 26 and accompanying text, further supports the possibility of recovery pursuant
to express contractual indemnification in future situations factually similar to Rosado.
29 See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 25, 484 N.E.2d at 1357, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 854. Comet did not
specifically agree to indemnify the manufacturer or hold it harmless for products liability
claims in the sales contract. Id.
10 See id. The court did not foreclose the possibility of recovery pursuant to express
contractual indemnity in situations factually similar to Rosado, but merely stated that no
basis existed in this case inasmuch as Comet had not specifically agreed to indemnify the
manufacturer or hold it harmless for products liability claims. See id.
:1 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
22 See Rosado, 66 N.Y.2d at 27, 484 N.E.2d at 1358, 494 N.Y.S.2d at 855.
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